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LIABILITY OF INDEPENDENT SERVICERS AND
REPAIRERS OF AIRCRAFT
RACHEL A. CAMPBELL
IMAGINE THAT THE owner of a small private plane
contracts with an aircraft service facility for several spe-
cific repairs. The servicer completes the work satisfacto-
rily but fails to notice a rusted wing bolt that would
necessitate repair work not in the contract. Soon after,
the owner is injured in a crash due to the rusted bolt. Is
the servicer liable?
Suppose an aircraft owner entrusts his twin engine jet
to an aircraft service facility for a regular maintenance in-
spection and signs a repair contract denying the servicers'
liability for any consequential damages. The subsequent
maintenance process results in the servicer accidentally
grinding a hole in the plane's wing. Can the owner re-
cover damages for loss of use of the aircraft?
Finally, imagine that an airplane owner leaves his craft
with a service facility for repairs, and the parties specifi-
cally agree that the ignition keys will be removed while the
plane is in the shop. During the night, two intoxicated
persons find the keys left in the ignition and proceed to fly
the plane, which crashes. Is the servicer liable for damage
to the aircraft?
These scenarios are real', and the issues raised are typi-
See, e.g., World Enterprises, Inc. v. Midcoast Aviation Serv., Inc., 713 S.W.2d
606 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (aircraft owner denied damages for loss of use in con-
tract action against repairer); Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539
P.2d 584 (1975) (aircraft owner denied recovery under strict liability theory
against repairer who approved plane after visual inspection); Lewis v. Jensen, 39
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cal of a growing number of cases being brought by aircraft
owners and passengers against servicers under a myriad
of theories growing out of the inspection, maintenance,
repair, or overhaul of aircraft and their components. 2
This comment examines developments in several of the
most common areas of aircraft servicer liability. Section I
focuses on servicer liability for negligence, including the
sub-issues of servicer compliance with Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) regulations, res ipsa loquitur, con-
tributory negligence by the pilot, and the borrowed ser-
vant doctrine. Section II examines strict liability in the
service context, an issue which has been addressed by a
large number of courts in recent years. Section III looks
at contract issues of servicer liability, including liability
limitations and breach of implied warranty of workman-
like service. Section IV contains a discussion of servicers'
potential liability as bailees. Finally, Section V provides
suggested guidelines to help servicers avoid liability
under these theories.
I. SERVICER LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
The law as to the negligence liability of aircraft repair-
men, servicemen, and maintenance facilities is influenced
in part by federal legislation and regulations, and in part
by case law resting primarily on established principles of
product liability law applicable to independent contrac-
tors engaged in the repair of chattels.3 As a practical mat-
ter, the measure of a defendant's negligence is based
upon whether he, acting as a prudent person, should have
anticipated the end result of his actions.4 If so, he can
Wash. 2d 301, 235 P.2d 312 (1951) (aircraft servicer held liable for destruction of
aircraft due to theft).
See Fulton, The Plight of Aircraft Manufacturers and Service Facilities, FOR THE DEF.
April 1982, at 16 [hereinafter Fulton]. It has been suggested that the rise of con-
sumerism has provided impetus to aircraft owners to make claims not only for
damage to the product itself, but also for the economic loss arising by reason of
the downtime necessary to repair the aircraft or one of its component parts. Id.
:1 2 S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAw 575 (1979) [hereinafter
SPEISER & KRAUSE].
F. BIEHLER, AVIATION MAINTENANCE LAW 88 (1975) [hereinafter F. BIEHLER].
generally be held liable for the damages sustained by the
plaintiff.5  These basic principles can be complicated,
however, by special circumstances often present in ser-
vicer liability cases, as illustrated below.
A. Establishing Liability
Actions against independent servicers or repairers of
aircraft for personal injury, death, or property damage al-
legedly caused by the servicer's negligence generally in-
volve application of traditional common-law concepts of
negligence, 6 including: (1) duty owed the plaintiff by de-
fendant; (2) a breach of this duty; and (3) injury occa-
sioned by such breach.7 The plaintiff must show and
prove the existence of all of these elements if he is to
recover.
1. The Duty of Reasonable Care
Assuming a duty of care exists, the question naturally
arises as to how much care is required. As usually ex-
pressed by the courts, the yardstick is that degree of care
which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised
under the same or similar circumstances." When applying
this standard to persons in the aviation industry, it is nec-
essary to look to the standards applied to other skilled
Id.
Annotation, Liability for Alleged Negligence of Independent Servicer or Repairer of Air-
craft, 41 A.L.R.3d 1320, 1322 (1972) [hereinafter Annotation]. Rare exceptions to
this general rule include actions brought under particular statutes, such as the
Death on the High Seas Act or specific municipal ordinances. Id.; see, e.g., Trihey v.
Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.) (repairer not liable for wrong-
ful death of passengers lost in unexplained crash of airliner in Pacific Ocean), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958); T.A.T. Flying Serv., Inc. v. Adamson, 47 Ga. App.
108, 169 S.E. 851 (1933) (repairer found guilty under city ordinance which pro-
hibited leaving aircraft unattended with motor running).
7 See Winans v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 705 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1983). The court
adopted the Restatement definition of the aircraft repairer's duty of care: "A re-
pairer has a duty, arising in tort, to exercise reasonable care and skill in the design
and repair of the object to be repaired commensurate with the risk of harm flow-
ing from the use of that product." Id. at 1453.
" F. BIEHLER, supra note 4.
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professions for guidance.9 The law requires those engag-
ing in activities requiring unique knowledge and ability to
give a performance commensurate with the undertaking.' 0
As one court stated in a case involving a physician, the
professional "must have latitude for play of reasonable
judgment, and this includes room for not too obvious or
gross errors according to the prevailing practice of his
craft."" It would therefore seem that the person respon-
sible for the maintenance of an aircraft should not be held
to a standard either appreciably greater or far below that
required of others entrusted with life and property.' 2 He
would accordingly be held liable only for negligence -
that is, a lack of due care or failure to comply with
the standards generally prevailing in his specialty
occupation. 3
9 Id.; see also 14 C.F.R. § 43 (1988), which sets forth requirements for certifica-
tion of aircraft servicers.
- F. BIEHLER, supra note 4.
it Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
21 F. BIEHLER, supra note 4, at 89.
I. Id. For examples of circumstances which have prompted decisions against
aircraft repairers, see Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479, 481 (10th
Cir. 1950) (rule of liability which applies to the manufacturer of goods is also
generally applicable to one who negligently makes, rebuilds, or repairs a chattel
for another); Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo.
1986) (en banc) (repairer liable for faulty work done without consulting supplier's
maintenance manual); Potter v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 291 Minn. 513, 189
N.W.2d 499 (1971) (repair station liable for negligent modification of a compo-
nent part); Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Serv. Int'l, Inc., 14
A.D.2d 749, 220 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1961) (aircraft service company liable for faulty
repairs); American Airways v. Ford Motor Co., 170 Misc. 721, 10 N.Y.S.2d 816
(1939) (repairer liable for plane crash caused by minute tool marks on propeller
hub).
For negligence cases where the results were favorable to repairers, see Spellissy
v. United Technologies Corp., 823 F.2d 438 (11 th Cir. 1987) (repairer not liable
where evidence of his procedures shows it unlikely that faulty pin was used);
Fisher v. Bell Helicopter Co., 403 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Colo. 1975) (helicopter
overhauler held not liable for crash which occurred eleven months after over-
haul); Lock v. Packard Flying Serv., Inc., 185 Neb. 71, 173 N.W.2d 516 (1970)
(repairer could not be expected to anticipate that pilot would neglect to make a
reasonable preflight inspection); Kenty v. Spartan Aircraft Co., 276 P.2d 928
(Okla. 1954) (repairer did not have reason to assume pilot would fail to discover
its failure to fuel the plane).
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a. Standards of Ordinary Care
One case illustrating actions found to constitute negli-
gence is Ingle v. Swish Manufacturing Southeast, Inc. "4 Appel-
lant, a pilot, survived a plane crash that occurred when his
plane apparently ran out of fuel while in the air.' 5 He
subsequently brought suit against the service facility that
had recently worked on the plane.' 6 The court reversed a
directed verdict for the service facility in light of evidence
that the servicer had neglected to perform a calibration of
the fuel cell probes that activate fuel gauge measurements
and affect fuel gauge accuracy.' 7 The evidence also
showed that the fuel gauge had been replaced in the plane
three years earlier and had never been calibrated, and that
the servicer had knowledge of these facts.' 8 The court
found that this evidence raised questions as to whether
the plane ran out of fuel, as to fuel gauge accuracy, as to
the degree of inspection required, performed, or ne-
glected by the servicer, and as to the undisputed failure of
the servicer to inform the appellant that the plane had
been run on the ground during maintenance.' 9
A more recent example of negligence by a servicer is
Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc.,2 ° which involved the
crash of a commercial airliner. The plaintiff, a passenger
14 164 Ga. App. 469, 297 S.E.2d 506 (1982).
I d., 297 S.E.2d at 508. The subject MU-2 plane, a sophisticated aircraft, was
leased out by its owner on a charter basis. Id. at 507. The plaintiff was employed
on a regular basis to pilot the aircraft. Id. In this particular instance, the plane
had been confiscated in the Bahamas following apparent use by a charterer for
drug smuggling; the interior was ravaged and there was other major damage. Id.
at 508. The plaintiff testified that he told the repairer he wanted a complete
"stem to stem" inspection of the plane, but the repairer stated that the plaintiff
mentioned only three or four specific things he wanted done. Id.
- id. at 507. The plaintiff's claims against the repairer included fraud and neg-
ligence. Id. at 509.
17 id. The plaintiff had filled the plane with fuel before leaving it with the re-
pairer. Id. at 508. During repairs the engine was run for a substantial length of
time as part of a "ground-run," but the repairer failed to inform the pilot of this
or to perform a calibration test - an annual requirement that is relatively simple
to perform and takes about an hour. Id.
is Id.
isId. at 509.
211 111 Idaho 594, 726 P.2d 706 (1986).
19881
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who survived the crash but suffered serious injuries, filed
suit against the plane's owner, lessee, manufacturer, and
servicer. 2 1 The court found that maintenance personnel
who had allowed bolts connecting the pilot's controls with
the plane's elevator devices to remain unfastened had ex-
hibited callous indifference to the safety of passengers,
and punitive damages of $750,000 were awarded. 22 In ad-
dition, the court found that evidence of numerous dis-
crepancies in maintenance practice and procedures was
relevant in examining why the particular maintenance
form that would have covered reinstallation of flight con-
trols on the plane was missing.23
In Cincotta v. United States,24 employees of a government
subcontractor were killed in a crash during a test flight. 25
The proximate cause of the crash was the negligent instal-
lation of a "snap ring" by Air Force technicians responsi-
ble for maintaining and repairing the aircraft.26 In
holding the defendant liable, the district court stressed
that the nature of the repair added "a measure of strict-
ness to the degree of care required of those charged with
the responsibility for the maintenance.., of these compo-
nents; because the safety of the aircraft and its crew is
involved.' '27
On the other hand, a servicer avoided liability for negli-
gence in Cheek v. Avco Lycoming Division.28 Soon after an
engine overhaul by the defendant servicer, the plaintiff's
21 Id., 726 P.2d at 709. The plaintiff's claim against each party was based on
negligence. Id.
22 Id. at 712. Evidence revealed that an inadequately sized bolt had been used,
without ever being secured with a nut or a cotter pin, to connect the pilot's con-
trols with the plane's elevator devices. Id. Although the plane subsequently un-
derwent numerous inspections over a period of months, and the bolt error was in
plain sight to mechanics during this time, the mistake apparently went undetected.
Id. Eventually, the bolt worked loose and the elevator devices failed during an
attempted landing, resulting in the fatal crash. Id. at 709.
'- Id. at 713.
24 362 F. Supp. 386 (D.C. Md. 1973).
2. Id. at 390.
21i ld. at 395.
7 Id. at 400.
- 56 11. App. 3d 217, 371 N.E.2d 994 (1977).
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plane exhibited violent vibrations which forced the plain-
tiff to make an emergency landing.2 9 The plaintiff subse-
quently had the engine disassembled and repaired by a
different service facility prior to bringing suit.3 0  The
court, in reversing an $8,100 judgment against the de-
fendant, held that aircraft engine parts and testimony re-
garding inspection of those parts were inadmissible in a
negligence action against an overhauler where the engine
had been out of the aircraft owner's control since the al-
leged malfunctioning, where several other mechanics had
inspected the engine, and where the engine had already
been disassembled and certain parts partially replaced.3 '
Similarly, the aircraft servicer prevailed in Fisher v. Bell
Helicopter Co. ,32 when a helicopter it had serviced eleven
months before crashed due to engine failure." Although
the district court stressed that "a plane is an inherently
dangerous and sensitive instrumentality which can cause
great harm if high standards of care are relaxed," 4 the
court held that these high standards had been met where
the servicer used parts approved (improperly) by the
manufacturer and performed its work properly in all re-
spects.3 5 These examples serve to illustrate that although
an aircraft servicer is not held to insure the safety of an
aircraft, he will apparently be held to a standard of spe-
cialized knowledge not applicable to those outside his
29 Id., 371 N.E.2d at 995. The overhaul had been commissioned by the plane's
previous owners, who sold the plane to the plaintiff approximately one year
before the emergency incident took place. Id.
.- Id. at 996. Soon after the emergency incident, the plaintiff had the engine
removed from the plane and sent to a repair service in Oklahoma, where it re-
mained for more than five months. Id. at 995. It was then returned to the plain-
tiff, disassembled, in a crate in which "he found missing parts, damaged parts,
good parts, and parts that had been partially repaired." Id. Of the engine parts
from the crate, nopie contained a serial number which would have identified the
engine, and thus the airplane, from which they were taken. Id. at 996.
1' Id. As the court stated, "[b]y the time [the plaintiff] received the disassem-
bled engine in a crate, visibly in substantially altered condition, it was questiona-
ble whether all of the parts even came from the same engine." Id.
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field, including pilots. This "unwritten standard" has led
to confusion recently in cases involving FAA regulations
and airworthiness directives, as it is sometimes unclear
whether the pilot or the mechanic has primary responsi-
bility for certain maintenance procedures. This dilemma
is discussed in the next subsection.
b. Negligence Per Se Under FAA Regulations
A statute or administrative regulation, if adopted for
the protection of a certain class of persons, may provide
the standard of care to such persons in negligence ac-
tions. 6 The doctrine of negligence per se holds that the
violation of such a statute or regulation, when resulting in
harm to a plaintiff who is within the class of persons in-
tended to be protected by the statute or regulation, will
be considered negligence as a matter of law.3 7 Under the
law of many states, violation of an applicable Federal Avi-
ation Regulation (FAR) amounts to negligence per se. 38
A recent case in illustration is Fagerquist v. Western Sun
Aviation, Inc. , in which the daughter of a pilot killed in an
airplane crash brought a wrongful death action against
the airplane retailer which also maintained the craft.4 0
The court applied the doctrine of negligence per se,
based on the principle that when the person injured is of
- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1974).
.17 W. TURLEY, AVIATION LITIGATION 38 (1986) [hereinafter W. TURLEY].
1 SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 3, § 1.17, at 45.
191 Cal. App. 3d 709, 236 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1987). The plane involved was a
42X Piper aircraft. Id., 236 Cal. Rptr. at 634. Defendant leased the craft to a local
commercial airline which employed the plaintiff's father as a pilot. Id.
- Id. A few days before the crash, the defendant had performed a scheduled
maintenance on the plane, replacing the No. 6 left engine cylinder with a new
cylinder. Id. Subsequently, plaintiff reported that the plane was running
"rough," and the defendant then did some trouble-shooting and cleaned and re-
placed some parts in the engine. Id. A short time later, the left engine ceased
functioning and the plane crashed. Id. at 635. Experts determined the left engine
failed because of a hole in the No. 6 cylinder caused by defective casting in the
manufacturing process. Id. Plaintiff elected not to sue the manufacturer, but re-
covered against the defendant servicer for strict products liability for selling a
defective aircraft and engine parts and for negligently maintaining the airplane.
Id.
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the class the regulation violated is designed to protect,
and the injury is of the type the regulation was promul-
gated to avoid, there is an inference that the injury proxi-
mately flowed from the violation.4 ' The court held that
FAA regulations which specifically prescribe safety-ori-
ented conduct necessarily set forth the standard of care
required by the doctrine of negligence per se.42 If the vio-
lation of a regulation can create a presumption of negli-
gence, the question arises as to whether compliance will
constitute non-negligence - and the answer is no.43 As
the effect of violation is to create an element of negli-
gence, so the effect of compliance is merely an indication
of due care.44
If the FAA decides that an unsafe condition exists which
warrants immediate corrective action, it may issue an Air-
worthiness Directive (AD).45 Once an AD is issued, it has
the force of law and therefore provides constructive no-
tice to all aircraft owners, operators, and overhaulers. 46 A
41 Id. at 642. The regulation at issue here involved the servicer's use of a
checklist mandated by the FAA during the inspection of aircraft. Id.; see 14 C.F.R.
§ 43.15(c)(1)(1988). The court noted that there was evidence that if the checklist
had been properly utilized and the mechanical history of the aircraft properly pro-
duced, the crack in the left engine cylinder which caused the crash would have
been discovered. Fagerquist, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43.
4 Fagerquist, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 639-42.
41 F. BIEHLER, supra note 4, at 108.
-44 Id.
45 14 C.F.R. § 39.1 (1981); see also Fulton, supra note 2, at 20. See generally Flem-
ing, The Duty of the Manufacturer to RecallAircraft, 45J. AIR L. & COM. 581 (1980) for
a discussion of ADs and the manufacturer's duty to recall defective aircraft.
Often, ADs are also based upon service bulletins which have been issued by man-
ufacturers to correct a defect. Fulton, supra note 2, at 20. ADs can range from the
requirement of a placard being affixed to the aircraft, explaining what actions
should be taken under certain circumstances, to emergency ADs issued to stop
flights so as to prevent catastrophic happenings. See Fleming, supra, at 582-583.
Before an AD is issued and published in the Federal Register, it must pass the
muster of the AD Review Board and its legal counsel. Fulton, supra note 2. It
then goes to the FAA in Oklahoma City, which has 72 hours to mail it to regis-
tered owners of the aircraft or equipment involved, according to FAA records. Id.
Methods of securing ADs include subscription to the Federal Register, the biweekly
AD Summary, issued by the FAA at Oklahoma City for both small and large air-
craft, and various private publications. Id.
, 14 C.F.R. § 39.3 (1988). ADs are Federal Aviation Regulations and are pub-
lished in the Federal Register as amendments to FAR Part 39.
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certain amount of confusion exists concerning who is re-
sponsible for AD compliance - the aircraft owner or the
mechanic? 47 The United States government has placed
the responsibility on owners to maintain their aircraft- in
accordance with Federal Air Regulations (FARs) .48 Of
these FARs, the one most likely to cause problems is Part
91,49 which places primary responsibility on owners to en-
sure compliance with technical mechanical standards.
Part 91 requires an inspection every twelve calendar
months by a properly authorized mechanic.50 Pursuant to
FAR Part 43, Appendix D, the mechanic must follow a
checklist during his inspection. 5' Implicit within this in-
spection is compliance with all ADs and a reporting of the
manner in which the AD compliance was accomplished.52
The inspector must set forth any alterations made on the
plane, and all entries must then be placed in the aircraft's
airframe log or engine log.53
It is generally thought that an owner who does not
check for AD compliance and make the appropriate log-
book entries opens himself to legal action.54 The owner
can claim, however, that he is at the mercy of the
mechanic and/or repair shop in ensuring complete com-
pliance with AD Notes, since many ADs apply to minor
components - such as alternators, fuel injection pump
gaskets, turbochargers, or seatbelt latches - which the
owner may not know are in his aircraft. 55 Eisner v.
47 F. BIEHLER, supra note 4, at 41.
48 See 14 C.F.R. § 43 (1988), which governs maintenance, preventive mainte-
nance, rebuilding, and alteration of aircraft and associated appliances. It specifies
who is authorized to perform these functions and keep the applicable records.
41, See 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.161 - 91.175 (1988).
51 14 C.F.R. § 91.163 (1988). This annual inspection is required in addition to
any 100-hour inspections due under 14 C.F.R. § 91.169(b), and must be properly
signed off by an Airframe and Power Plant Mechanic with an Inspection Authori-
zation (IA) certification. Id. An annual inspection can replace the 100-hour in-
spection, but a 100-hour inspection cannot replace an annual. Id.
., 14 C.F.R. § 43 App. D (1988).
52 Id.; see 14 C.F.R. § 43.11(b) (1988).
r:, 14 C.F.R. § 43.12 (1988).
54' See Fulton, supra note 2, at 21.
r" Id.; see, e.g., 49 Fed. Reg. 5057 (1984) (AD added for certain wire bundles in
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Bethori 56 is one example of a case considering the rights of
an aircraft owner against a service facility for failure to
comply with an AD note. The defendant was a certified
FAA aircraft mechanic hired by the plaintiff to conduct a
pre-purchase inspection of a plane the plaintiff was inter-
ested in buying.5 7 In the presence of the plaintiff, the de-
fendant conducted what the plaintiff understood to be an
airworthiness inspection.5 8 The defendant reported to
the plaintiff that he found nothing to indicate the airplane
was not airworthy.5 9 The court found, however, that the
defendant was negligent in failing to discover and advise
the plaintiff of an outstanding AD note,60 and further,
failed to comply with his contractual obligation to the
plaintiff.61 The issue of who is responsible for compliance
with ADs has not been settled by existing cases, and this
Lockheed jets); 49 Fed. Reg. 5919 (1984) (AD added for connector sockets in
certain aircraft).
,15 Case No. 995, 322 (Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court of Ohio, 1980),
as cited in Fulton, supra note 2, at 21.
11 Id. As a certified FAA aircraft mechanic, the defendant was authorized to
pass upon the airworthiness of a plane, subject to FAA regulations. Id.; see 14
C.F.R. § 43.7 (1988). If he found that a plane that came under his care was not
airworthy, he was obliged to so notify the owner; if any defects that caused it to be
unairworthy were not corrected, the fact of its not being airworthy was to be re-
ported to the FAA. See 14 C.F.R. § 43.11 (1988).
.1 Eisner, supra note 56. The defendant had been advised of the purpose for
which the inspection had been requested. Id.
fl Id.
,ill Id. The FAA periodically issued airworthiness directive orders (AD Notes) to
all certified mechanics, who were obliged to retain them for reference. Id. On
February 13, 1968, the FAA issued such an AD Note for the Hartzell propeller on
the S35 Bonanza aircraft. Apparently, the defendant failed to make the plaintiff
aware of this particular note. Id.
Id. The court stated:
Defendant ... seems to contend that because Section 91.63 of appli-'
cable FAA rules holds that the owner or operator of a plane is pri-
marily responsible for maintaining the plane, that there, therefore,
was no obligation upon him. The obligation for maintaining the
plane in an airworthy condition, so far as the general public is con-
cerned, is that of the owner. However, the rule that requires an air-
craft mechanic be licensed by the FAA and to comply with its
regulations imposed the obligation to exercise ordinary care and
also to comply with the obligations of his contract.
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issue will no doubt be a continuing source of litigation.62
Clarification of this area by the FAA would greatly assist
all parties involved and would help to ensure uniform out-
comes in similar cases.
2. Res Ipsa Loquitur in Servicer Liability Cases
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for
itself") creates a presumption of negligence under certain
circumstances. 3 When there is an accident of the type
which ordinarily does not occur without being caused by
negligence, the other probable causes are eliminated by
the evidence, and the indicated negligence is within the
scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff, then the de-
fendant's negligence may be inferred. 64 Therefore, at first
glance, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would seemingly
be very useful in overcoming a common obstacle in ser-
vicer liability cases: proof of actual negligence during the
servicing process. 65
To impose liability under the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur, a plaintiff generally must show that: (1) the event is of
a kind that seldom occurs without negligence; (2) the in-
strument which caused the injury was in the exclusive con-
trol of the defendant; and (3) the injury was not due to the
plaintiff's own action. 66 It is the second of these require-
ments that most often presents difficulty for a plaintiff at-
6; See, e.g., F. BIEHLER, supra note 4, at 40-41.
- W. TURLEY, supra note 37, at 38.
- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965). The doctrine allows a
plaintiff who does not have any knowledge of or access to the facts concerning the
defendant's conduct to point to the fact of the accident, and to create an inference
that, even without a precise showing of how the defendant behaved, the defendant
was probably negligent. Id. Some courts view res ipsa loquitur as creating a pre-
sumption of negligence which would shift the burden of proof, while other courts
view it as providing circumstantial evidence which permits an inference of negli-
gence but does not shift the burden of proof. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Crabtree, 36
Tenn. App. 469, 258 S.W.2d 782, 784 (1953).
, The doctrine has been successfully invoked by plaintiffs in plane crash cases
against pilots and airlines. See, e.g., Newing v. Cheatham, 15 Cal. 3d 351, 540 P.2d
33, 124 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1975) (pilot liable for negligence in unexplained plane
crash).
.... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965).
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tempting to recover against a servicer under this theory.6 7
Because the duty for proper maintenance of a plane is
usually shared by the pilot or owner and the repairer, it
generally cannot be said as a matter of law that the re-
pairer had exclusive control over the plane so as to render
res ipsa loquitur applicable. 68
Moreover, some states impose additional res ipsa loqui-
tur requirements that have presented difficulty for plain-
tiffs seeking to recover against aircraft servicers. In Stevens
v. Bernard,6 9 for example, the court held that the mere oc-
currence of a plane crash together with a repairer's exclu-
sive control of the aircraft prior to the crash did not,
under Oklahoma law, establish the "foundation fact"
from which an inference of negligence could be drawn
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.70 The court ex-
plained that the plaintiff must present cogent evidence as
to the cause of the accident; the court would not simply
infer that the defendant was negligent in repairing the air-
craft and then, from that inference, "further infer that
such negligence created a defective condition in the air-
craft which was the proximate cause of the accident....
67 See Annotation, supra note 6, at 1324.
- See, e.g., Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.) (court
concluded that to consider the repairer liable there must be a showing that its
failure to maintain the plane in proper mechanical condition was a proximate
cause of the crash), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958); Power Serv. Supply, Inc. v.
E.W. Wiggins Airways, Inc., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 399 N.E.2d 878 (1980) (res ipsa
loquitur inapplicable where suit was brought against helicopter repair company
for personal injuries and property damage arising from the crash of a helicopter
which was found with a crucial nut and bolt missing).
w, 512 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1975).
7,, Id. at 880. As the court explained:
[Wihile there is a conflict in the decisions relative to the application
of that doctrine, there is no dispute relative to the meaning of the
words res ipsa loquitur. They simply mean "the thing speaks for
itself." And that means the thing or in.trumentality involved speaks for
itself. It clearly does not mean the accident speaks for itself. It means
that when the initial fact, namely what thing or instrumentality
caused the accident has been shown then, and not before, an infer-
ence arises that the injury or damage occurred by reason of the neg-
ligence of the party who had it under his exclusive control.
Id. I, d. at 880-81. The court stressed that "[ain inference (of negligence under
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In a second example, the court in Winans v. Rockwell In-
ternational Corp.72 also refused to apply res ipsa loquitur
against an aircraft repairer. The court stated that under
Louisiana law, the real res ipsa loquitur inquiry is whether
the facts of the controversy suggest negligence of the de-
fendant, rather than some other factor, as the most plausi-
ble explanation of the accident. 73 The trial court refused
to instruct the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
because a defendant whose fault caused the injury was not
joined, fault by the deceased pilots of the jet was not ne-
gated, and it was not shown that others who had control
of the jet after the defendants were fault-free.74
In summary, because servicers seldom have exclusive
control over the maintenance of an aircraft, courts seem
reluctant to infer servicer negligence absent some addi-
tional proof, thus rendering the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur virtually useless in servicer liability cases. As a result,
plaintiffs relying solely on the res ipsa loquitur theory
generally have not prevailed against aircraft servicers in
liability cases.
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur) arises only from an established foundation fact. The
inference cannot supply the foundation fact from which it arises." Id. at 880 (em-
phasis in original).
72 705 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1983). The case involved a wrongful death action
brought against manufacturers and repairers of a jet that exploded in midair. Id.
at 1451. Two pilots, attempting an emergency landing after discovering an
onboard fire, died.in the explosion. Id. The evidence showed that in the period
before the accident, the aircraft had been leaking fuel. Id. An employee of the
owner had called the repairer to inform him of the leak; the repairer advised that
the leak was not a significant problem and advised against attempting to repair it
at that time. Id. Although other minor repairs were subsequently performed by
the repairer, no effort was ever made to repair the fuel leak. Id.
7 Id. at 1455. The court noted that "[a]pplication of the principle [of res ipsa
loquitur] is defeated if an inference that the accident was due to a cause other than
the defendant's negligence could be drawn as reasonably as one that it was due to
his negligence." Id.
74 Id. The court explained that "[i]mportant in actions of this class is that the
plaintiff prove freedom of fault on the part of all through whose hands the instru-
mentality passed after it left the defendant." Id.
- See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text for examples of servicer liability
cases where res ipsa loquitur was determined inapplicable.
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B. Potential Defenses to Negligence Liability
1. Contributory Negligence
In certain instances, aircraft servicers have escaped lia-
bility when their alleged negligence resulted in a danger
that would have been disclosed had the airplane's pilot
discharged his responsibility of making a preflight inspec-
tion.76 Servicers have also avoided liability when their al-
leged negligence would have been of no consequence if
the pilot had merely performed the customary practice of
checking his gasoline and oil gauges." On the other hand,
contributory negligence failed as a defense to repairer lia-
bility in Woodling v. Garrett Corp.,78 in which the widow of a
deceased airplane passenger brought a wrongful death ac-
tion against both the owner and operator of the aircraft
and the manufacturer and repairer of the engine part.79
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the finding that defects in the manufacture
and repair of an aircraft part had proximately caused the
airplane to crash, notwithstanding the alleged intervening
negligence of the owner and operator of the airplane in
failing to ground the plane despite repeated "tripping" of
the plane's generators.80 The court's finding was sup-
ported by evidence that the manufacturer and repairer
knew that the operator of the aircraft would not, on his
own, be able to correct the defect.8
Woodling thus established that under New York law,
notwithstanding the intervening act of a third person be-
7, 14 C.F.R. § 91.29 (1988) states that no person may operate a civil airplane
that is not airworthy, and the pilot in command is responsible for determining
whether that airplane is in condition for safe flight. "A reasonable interpretation
of this requirement is that the pilot is responsible for detecting those unairworthy
conditions that the average pilot would spot." F. BIEHLER, supra note 4, at 35. "It
is wholly unreasonable to expect that he would be required to perform a detailed
inspection prior to flight." Id.
7 See Annotation, supra note 6, at 1322.
-' 813 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1987).
71 Id. at 543. The plane, a Lockheed Jetstar, crashed near Westchester Airport
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tween the original negligence and the ultimate injury, the
original negligent actor can be found to have proximately
caused the injury if the intervening act was normal and
foreseeable. The negligence of the intervening actor who
knows of the dangers and merely fails to warn or other-
wise protect the plaintiff does not, of itself, relieve the
original actor from liability.82 This example again illus-
trates the specialized standard of "reasonable" care ap-
plied to servicers of aircraft even as against pilots, who are
assumed to have somewhat specialized knowledge them-
selves as to aircraft maintenance procedures. Although
negligence by a pilot as to very basic inspection proce-
dures can relieve a servicer of liability, the courts seem
reluctant to allow such relief for servicers in all but the
most blatant pilot negligence cases.8 3
2. The Borrowed Servant Doctrine
The borrowed servant doctrine also stands as a poten-
tial defense for repairers charged with negligence. Ac-
cording to this doctrine, if the general employees of one
employer are placed under the control of another em-
ployer in the manner of performing their services, they
become his special or borrowed employees and he can be
held liable for the consequences of their negligence.84 Al-
ternatively, if the employees remain under the control of
their general employer in the manner of performing their
services, the general employer is liable for their
negligence.85
In Franks v. Associated Air Center, Inc. ,86 an action was
brought against an aircraft repair company for negligently
damaging the plaintiff's airplane while attempting to re-
pair it.87 The defendant invoked the borrowed servant
. Id.
8. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
"4 See Franks v. Associated Air Centers, Inc., 663 F.2d. 583, 587 (5th Cir. 1981).
In d.
663 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1981).
17 Id. at 584. In addition to the negligent repair claim, the plaintiff also sued
under Texas' Deceptive Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. & CoM.
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doctrine in attempting to hold the plaintiff vicariously lia-
ble for the negligence of the employees who had worked
on the aircraft.8 8 Although the defendant acknowledged
that the maintenance workers were not under the plain-
tiff's employ, the defendant charged that the workers
were subject to the plaintiff's right of control.8 9 The de-
fendant's contention was that when the retraction test was
being performed, the plaintiff's employees who were
present had the right to control the defendant's employ-
ees working on the aircraft.90 In finding for the plaintiff,
the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the fact that one gives general instructions and directions
to another's employee is not sufficient to make the em-
ployee a borrowed servant, nor is cooperation and consul-
tation with the employees enough to establish a right of
control.9 Although the court determined that the bor-
CODE ANN. § 17.41 (Vernon 1987), alleging that the defendant had charged him
an unconscionable amount for its services. Id. A jury found for the plaintiff on
both claims and the trial judge denied the defendant's motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. Id. The defendant then appealed
from the denial of its motions. Id.
8H Id. at 585. The plane, an HFD 320 Hansa jet aircraft owned by plaintiffJohn
Franks, was flown by two of the plaintiff's employees to the defendant's repair
facilities. Id. The plane was brought to the defendant for repair of the landing
gear and landing gear doors of the aircraft. The plaintiff's employees were
alerted to this problem when a warning light in the cockpit indicated that the
wheel door, which was supposed to close following retraction of the landing gear,
would not completely close. Id. To determine the cause of the malfunction, a
retraction test was performed, in which the plane was lifted from the floor upon
jacks and a device called a hydraulic mule was used to pump fluid through the
plane's hydraulic system. Id. One of the plaintiff's employees assisted in the test
by sitting in the cockpit to raise and lower the landing gear while the defendants
employees applied pressure to the plane's hydraulic system through the use of the
hydraulic mule. Id. The plaintiff's second employee stood by on the ground dur-
ing the procedure. Id. During the last recycling of fluid through the plane's hy-
draulic system, there was a loud ripping noise, apparently due to too much
pressure having been applied to the system. Id. Considerable damage occurred
to the landing gear systems of the aircraft, and substantial amounts of hydraulic
fluid were sprayed about. Id. The plane was subsequently transferred to a differ-
ent repairer and was ultimately repaired at a cost of $4,416.40 in labor and
$7,026.07 in parts. Id. On top of this, the plaintiff received a bill from the defend-
ant repairer for $2,175 in labor charges. Id.
- id. at 587.
-, Id.
mId. The court found "considerable evidence" to support the jury's finding
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rowed servant doctrine was not applicable to the facts of
Franks, it did not preclude the possibility that the facts in
similar cases might establish a right to control.92
II. STRICT LIABILITY OF AIRCRAFT REPAIRERS
Although Section 402A of the American Law Institute
Restatement (Second) of Torts93 provides for strict liabil-
0
the employee who had assisted in the cockpit did not have a right of control over
defendant's employees, since he was "in the cockpit and unable to see what [the
defendant's employee] was doing; more importantly, he was actually being in-
structed by [the defendant's employee] when to raise and lower the landing gear."
Id. The defendant also contended that, regardless of whether the plaintiff's em-
ployee standing by on the ground did actually supervise the procedure, the fact
that he felt he had the right to tell the defendant's employees that they were doing
something wrong if he saw it meant that he had a right of control. Id. To this the
court responded:
We think this argument misconstrues the meaning of "right of con-
trol" in the context of the borrowed servant doctrine. The fact that
an employer gives general instructions and directions to the em-
ployee of another is not sufficient to make the latter a borrowed ser-
vant. Nor is a co-operation and consultation with the employees
enough to establish a right of control. Right of control is necessarily
determined as an inference from such facts and circumstances as the
nature of the general project, the nature of the work to be per-
formed by the machinery and employees furnished, length of the
special employment, the type of machinery furnished, acts repre-
senting an exercise of actual control, the right to substitute another
operator of the machine, etc.
Id. at 587-88 (citations omitted).
Finally, in response to the defendant's argument that the right to substitute
another operator is an important factor to be considered in determining the right
to control, the court noted that there was no evidence in the record that the plain-
tiff's employee could have ordered the defendant's employees to stand aside and
let him perform the work himself. Id. at 588.
1, Id. at 587.
1'.1 Section 402A of the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides in full:
§ 402 A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to
User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
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ity of the seller of a product, it is less clear whether strict
liability applies to a provider of services. In general, the
emerging view seems to be that the rendering of services
does not give rise to the doctrine of strict liability because
usually there is no mass production and distribution, nor
are there consumers needing protection from an un-
known manufacturer or seller.94 Texas is among the
states which have consistently refused to apply strict lia-
bility to sellers of services,95 although the rule in the
sales/service hybrid situation is less clear.96 Few aircraft
servicer cases have examined this issue to date, but it
seems logical that aircraft repairs could be analogized to
repairs of other complex machinery. Courts in cases in-
volving such machinery repairs have generally refused to
apply the strict liability doctrine. 97
From the aircraft repairer liability cases involving this
issue to date, 98 it seems that the courts have yet to hold an
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in preparation and sale
of his product and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or en-
tered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
14 La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968); see also Kaplan
v. C. Lazy U Ranch, 615 F. Supp. 234, 238 n.l (D. Colo. 1985).
!m See, e.g., Thomas v. St. Joseph Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(strict liability not applicable where product was not defective apart from profes-
sional services connected with its use); Langford v. Kraft, 551 S.W.2d 392, 396
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977), aff'd, 565 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1978) (concept of strict liabil-
ity not applicable to defective services).
- See Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (strict
liability applicable where city provided both product and service through utility
company).
97 See, e.g., Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska
1984) (servicer of electric generator not subject to strict liability); Steckal v.
Haughton Elevator Co., 59 N.Y.2d 628, 449 N.E.2d 1264, 463 N.Y.S.2d 186
(1983) (servicer of elevator could not be held strictly liable for defect which devel-
oped after installation); Stuckey v. Young Exploration Co., 586 P.2d 726 (Okla.
1978) (strict liability not applicable to repairer of truck steering system). But see
Consumers Power Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 780 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1986) (ap-
plying NJ. law) (plaintiff could recover against repairer under strict liability the-
ory for damages from defectively repaired engine).
See also Annotation, Application of Rule of Strict Liability in Tort to Person Rendering
Services, 29 A.L.R.3d 1425 (1970) for cases considering application of strict liabil-
ity to other types of services.
1,1 See, e.g., Winans v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 705 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1983) (ap-
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aircraft repairer strictly liable in tort solely for damages
stemming from work he has performed. One of the earli-
est cases to address this issue was Raritan Trucking Corp. v.
Aero Commander, Inc.99 Although the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit declined to hold anair-
craft repair shop strictly liable in tort for failing to correct
a landing gear strut extension, the court recognized that
many of the same policy considerations supporting strict
liability in product sales cases were also present under the
facts before it:
Here we have a similar risk of harm to Raritan, its employ-
ees, passengers, and members of the public from the oper-
ation of a plane with inoperable landing gear. In turning
the plane over to Raritan after repairing it, Continental
[the servicer of the aircraft] necessarily represented that
the landing gear remained in proper operating condition.
And Raritan's reliance was, of necessity, great. Raritan
had neither adequate knowledge nor sufficient opportu-
nity to determine if the work on the landing gear had left it
plying La. law) (repairer of engines on jet that exploded in midair could not be
held liable on strict liability theory for engine defects existing after it overhauled
the engine); Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3d
Cir. 1972) (applying N.J. law) (strict liability not applicable against aircraft re-
pairer where no goods or other property was supplied); Hoffman v. Simplot Avia-
tion, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975) (pilot injured in plane crash could
not recover from aircraft repairer under theory of strict liability). But see Wagner
v. Flightcraft, Inc., 31 Wash. App. 558, 643 P.2d 906 (1982) (repairer who sold
carburetor repair kit and then sold overhauled carburetor to plane's owner was
seller for strict liability purposes).
See Davis, Aviation Repair Stations and Strict Liability, 40 J. AIR L. & CoM. 413
(1974) [hereinafter Davis], for a discussion of potential liability in negligence and
strict liability, both directly and vicariously, against the segments of the aviation
industry involved in the inspection, maintenance, repair and overhaul of aircraft
and their various components.
). 458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1972). Approximately one year after the plaintiff took
possession of the aircraft, the manufacturer issued a service bulletin to correct a
possible landing gear strut extension which could prevent the landing gear from
locking in an "up" position. Id. at 1109. Part I of the bulletin called for inspec-
tion of the strut within the next 25 hours' flight time, while Part II of the bulletin
specified modifications to prevent future strut overextension. Id. The defendant
servicer performed Part I and found no overextension. Id. After this inspection
the plane was flown for about 16 hours and made 15 landings with no noted diffi-
culty. Id. Shortly thereafter, the defendant undertook the modifications required
by Part II of the service bulletin, and on the very next flight two days later a crash
occurred. Id.
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in proper operating condition, and thus had to rely upon
the skill, care, and reputation of Continental. 00
Even though these similar elements were present, the
court was "convinced that the application of strict liability
by the New Jersey courts in this case cannot be predicated
with great assurance."''
Like the court in Raritan, the majority of jurisdictions
today have refused to impose strict liability on those who
merely provide repairs, 0 2 although public policy grounds
for subjecting the furnisher of services to strict liability
have been vigorously advanced.1 0 3 In Hoffman v. Simplot
lo Id. at 1114.
1o Id. The court noted that "no NewJersey case has extended the strict liability
theory to a case in which there has been no goods or other property supplied,"
and did not "think that the New Jersey courts would extend strict liability to this
case." Id. at 1113. But see Consumers Power Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 780
F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying N.J. law) (plaintiff allowed recovery on strict
liability theory for damages caused by defectively repaired engine where major
parts which were also supplied were defective).
.... See, e.g., Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, 604 F.2d 950 (5th
Cir. 1979) (strict liability cannot be imposed upon a repairer who failed to warn
customers of patent dangers which were neither created nor aggravated by the
repair services it provided); Lemley v.J & B Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (under Pennsylvania law, repairer cannot be held strictly liable for services
or repairs); Slayton v. Wright, 271 Cal. App. 2d 219, 76 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1969)
(court refused to apply strict liability against installer); McLeod v. W.S. Merrell
Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965) (strict liability not applicable to servicer of prod-
uct); see also 2 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 6.15 (2d ed. 1974); Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied
Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 661, 679-86 [hereinafter
Greenfield]; Note, Products and the Professional: Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid
Transactions, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 111 (1972); Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Cit-
adel Under Assault, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 13 (1978); Comment, Application of Strict Lia-
bility to Repairers: A Proposal for Legislative Action in the Face ofJudicial Inaction, 8 PAC.
L.J. 865 (1977).
In addition, a number ofjurisdictions have held that repairers and other provid-
ers of services are not "sellers" within the meaning of Section 402A and thus are
not subject to its rule of strict liability for injuries caused by defects in products
supplied by them in the course of their services. See, e.g., Vergott v. Desert Phar-
maceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972) (hospital not "seller" of needle that
broke in patient's vein); La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 943 (3d
Cir. 1968) (engineering firm not strictly liable for injuries resulting from its serv-
ices); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954) (hos-
pital not a "seller" of blood).
See, e.g., Johnson, 604 F.2d at 955-56, in which the court stated:
[T]he reasons for imposing strict liability on a manufacturer do not
apply equally to a furnisher of services upon whom liability is sought
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Aviation, Inc.,104 the several owners of an airplane sued a
repair company when their plane crashed after a wing
strut broke, following a visual inspection of the airplane
by the repairers. 05 After noting that the rule of strict lia-
bility for suppliers of services had been uniformly and
consistently rejected by other jurisdictions, the Idaho
to be imposed for defects neither created nor aggravated by it. Such
liability is imposed on manufacturers "to insure that the costs of in-
juries resulting from defective products are to be borne by the man-
ufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." (citation
omitted) . . . In some cases an installer or repairer might be in a
better position than the consumer of a product to detect dangerous
defects in a product, but in many cases such a contractor would not
have the knowledge necessary to recognize such defects or the op-
portunity to detect them in furnishing services. Imposing a duty to
discover and warn of dangers would require them more fully to ex-
amine the products they service, and to pass on the cost of this addi-
tional service not ordered by the consumer.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d
443, 266 N.E. 2d 897 (1970) (hospital strictly liable for supplying impure blood);
Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697, 701 (1969) (beauty parlor
strictly liable for supplying defective hair lotion); Reilly v. King County Central
Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246 (1971) (blood bank that sup-
plied defective blood held strictly liable); Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid Transac-
tions, A Policy Approach, 28 Sw. L.J. 575 (1974); Comment, Continuing the Common
Law Response to the New Industrial State: The Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer
Services, 22,UCLA L. REV. 401 (1974).
Similarly, as distinguished from repairs, an overhaul might be seen as more
closely resembling the manufacture of a new product, and there is some authority
to support strict liability in this situation. See Craig v. Burch, 228 So. 2d 723 (La.
Ct. App. 1969) (defendant who recapped a tire held strictly liable to a car owner
and passenger); Davis, supra note 98, at 423. But see Winans v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 705 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1983) (repairer could not be held strictly liable for
engine defects existing after it overhauled jet engines).
... 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975).
1o5 Id., 539 P.2d at 587. The plaintiff did not allege that any of the repair work
done by the defendant was a causative factor in the crash of the aircraft. Id.
Rather, the plaintiff noted that in performing some general repairs, the defendant
was working in close proximity to a certain clevis bolt which attached the left wing
strut to the fuselage-a bolt which later failed and thus caused the plane to crash.
Id. The principal factual dispute related to the condition of the clevis bolt at the
time the defendant completed the repairs and made the visual inspection of the
aircraft. Id. There was testimony to the effect that the bolt showed signs of rust
and therefore failure could have been anticipated. Id. However, the defendant
denied that the rust was visible to him as he worked on the aircraft and claimed
that because of the age and condition of the aircraft the rust had no significance.
Id.
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Supreme Court likewise rejected strict liability against the
defendant, stating:
It is sufficient to say that as contrasted with the sales of
products, personal services do not involve mass produc-
tion with the difficulty, if not inability, of the obtention of
the proof of negligence. The consumer in the personal
service context usually comes into direct contact with the
one offering service and is aware or can determine what
work was performed and who performed it.' 6
As distinguished from repairs, an overhaul more closely
resembles the manufacture of a new product and seem-
ingly would offer greater support for imposition of strict
liability. 0 7 At least one recent case, however, has pre-
cluded strict liability for overhaulers as well as repairers.
In Winans v. Rockwell International Corp.,108 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a
repairer of engines on a jet that exploded in midair could
not be held liable on a strict liability theory for engine de-
fects existing after it overhauled the engine.'0 9 These ex-
amples, together with the stated rationales, seem to
illustrate an emerging trend against applying strict liabil-
ity in cases involving aircraft repairs.
III. CONTRACT LIABILITY OF AIRCRAFT REPAIRERS
Several contract issues commonly arise in aircraft re-
Id. at 588.
1,,7 See supra notes 97 and 103 for examples of supporting and conflicting
authority.
-8. 705 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1983). The case involved a wrongful death action
brought against manufacturers and repairers of a jet that exploded in midair; see
supra note 72 for a discussion of the facts and holding.
1m 705 F.2d at 1452. The court noted that Louisiana courts to date had applied
the strict liability doctrine only to manufacturers. Id. In undertaking the overhaul
of the jet engines in this case, the court stated, the defendant had acted not as a
manufacturer but as a repairer. Id. In drawing its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit
declined to follow Various Underwriters at Lloyds v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 389 F.
Supp. 831 (W.D. La. 1975) and Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d
709 (10th Cir. 1974), cited by the plaintiff as support for the proposition that a
party who overhauls an airplane engine is subject to strict liability. Id. at 1453.
The court noted that both of these cases apparently involved much more drastic
overhauls than that undertaken by the defendant in Winans. Id.
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pairer liability cases, including liability limitations and the
implied warranty of workmanlike service.
A. Liability Limitations
Although liability limitations in service contracts have
been held unconscionable in certain instances, other
courts have upheld such limitations. For example, in
World Enterprises, Inc. v. Midcoast Aviation," 10 the court held
that a provision in the repair contract which excluded inci-
dental and consequential damages resulting from a
breach of contract to repair an airplane was not uncon-
scionable or against public policy."' Further, the court
held that the wording of the clause disallowed recovery of
economic damages for loss of use while the plane was be-
ing repaired." 2 In reaching this decision, the court con-
sidered the fact that the limitation clause was contained in
a contract between two commercial entities that had pre-
viously contracted with each other, was not hidden in fine
print, was capitalized and underscored, and was neither
unusual nor particularly harsh." 3 This example seems
typical of the tendency of modern courts to uphold such
limitations when they are set forth clearly and the parties
appear to be dealing on equal footing.' 14
11, 713 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. 1986). The case involved an action by the plane
owner against the repairer for damage caused when the repairer attempted to
remove a crack from the plane's wing by grinding, which resulted in a hole in the
wing. Id. at 607.
", Id. at 610. In examining this issue, the court noted that unconscionability
can be either procedural or substantive. Id. Procedural unconscionability arises
during the contracting process and involves fine print, misrepresentation, and un-
equal bargaining positions. Id. at 611. Substantive unconscionability involves un-
due harshness in the contract terms themselves. Id. Neither type was found to
exist here. Id.
1"2 Id. at 610. The court pointed out that the contract here provided specific
reference to "incidental or consequential commercial damages or losses," and
noted that under the Uniform Commercial Code, many courts have held that con-
sequential damages specifically include damages for loss of use. Id.
Id. at 611.
See, e.g., Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d
1519 (9th Cir. 1987) (exculpatory clause in contract for sale of aircraft was not
void as against public policy); 2000 Watermark Ass'n Inc. v. Celotex Corp., 784
F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 1986) (contract law permits parties to negotiate allocation of
B. Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Service
The theory of an implied warranty of workmanlike ser-
vice was endorsed in the 1950s in several United States
Supreme Court decisions dealing with ship repairs," 5 and
has since been applied as well to aircraft repairs. The
Supreme Court established early on that the warranty of
workmanlike service is comparable to a manufacturer's
warranty of the soundness of a manufactured product,
and negligence plays no part in this theory of recovery.'t 6
In subsequent cases, the Court reaffirmed the implied
warranty theory and outlined the policy reasons for im-
posing this essentially "strict" liability:
True the defect here was latent and the stevedore free of
negligent conduct .... But latent defects may be attributa-
ble to improper manufacture or fatigue due to long use
and may be discoverable by subjecting the equipment to
appropriate tests .... It is considerations such as these
that underlie a manufacturer's or seller's obligation to
supply products free of defects and a shipowner's obliga-
tion to furnish a seaworthy vessel. They also serve to
render a tort standard of negligence inapplicable to the
stevedore's liability under its warranty of workmanlike ser-
vice. For they illustrate that liability should fall upon the
party best situated to adopt preventive measures and
thereby to reduce the likelihood of injury. Where, as here,
injury-producing and defective equipment is under the su-
pervision and control of the stevedore, the shipowner is
powerless to minimize the risk; the stevedore is not."' 7
This theory of implied warranty was applied to aircraft
risk); Coastal Iron Works, Inc. v. Petty Ray Geophysical, 783 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.
1986) (a shipyard contract limiting liability will be upheld as long as parties to the
contract have more or less equal bargaining strength).
". See Italia Societa v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964); Crumady
v. The J.H. Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). All three cases involved actions by a ship-
owner to recover indemnity from a stevedoring contractor, where the contractor's
employee had recovered judgment against the shipowner on the basis of unsea-
worthiness; see also Davis, supra note 98, at 418.
.. Ryan Stevedoring, 350 U.S. at 133-34.
,,7 Italia Societa, 376 U.S. at 323-24 (footnote omitted).
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repairs in Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc. 118 In confirming
the existence of an implied warranty of workmanlike ser-
vice, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the standard
imposed may vary depending upon the expertise of the
actor, the nature of the services, and the known resultant
danger to others from the actor's negligence or failure to
perform." 9 In attempting to determine the precise dis-
tinction between the doctrine of implied warranty and
negligence in cases involving the rendering of personal
services, however, the court failed to recognize the sub-
stantive difference between the two doctrines as earlier es-
tablished by the Supreme Court.120 As a result of this blur
in reasoning, the Hoffman court ultimately held that both
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are
defenses to the theory of implied warranty' 21 -- a theory
which has not been well-supported. 122 In summary, the
theory of implied warranty of workmanlike service,
although relatively novel, seems to be gaining some ac-
ceptance in the area of services 23 and is a potentially ap-
plicable cause of action in aircraft repairer liability cases.
8is 97 Idaho at 32, 539 P.2d at 584; see supra notes 104-105 and accompanying
text for the factual background of Hoffman.
Hoffman, 539 P.2d at 588. The court noted, however, that:
The services of experts are sought because of their special skill.
They have a duty to exercise the ordinary skill and competence of
members of their profession, and a failure to discharge that duty will
subject them to liability for negligence. Those who hire such persons are
not justified in expecting infallibility, but can expect only reasonable care and
competence. They purchase service, not insurance.
Id. (citing Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954)).
202 See Ryan Stevedoring, 350 U.S. at 133-34, emphasizing that negligence plays
no part in the doctrine of implied warranty of workmanlike service.
"2 Hoffman, 539 P.2d at 590.
,22 See Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833
(Alaska 1967) (contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery under the implied
warranty of workmanlike service); Note, The Application of Implied Warranties to
Predominantly "Service" Transactions, 31 OHIo ST. LJ. 580 (1970).
12- See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Radiant Elec. Co., 55 Mich. App. 410,
222 N.W.2d 323 (1974) (electrician held to extend an implied warranty of fitness
for both the wiring and the manner in which it was installed); see also Farnsworth,
Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957);
Greenfield, supra note 102, at 661.
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IV. THE SERVICER'S LIABILITY AS A BAILEE
Generally, the common law principles of bailment and
negligence control the disposition of cases involving the
liability of the bailee of an aircraft for damage to the
craft. 24 Whether the action on the bailment sounds in
contract or tort appears, for the most part, to make little
difference in the outcome of the cases; determinations of
whether or not the bailment contract was breached, or
whether or not the bailee was negligent in handling the
property, are dependent upon similar factors. These fac-
tors include the duties of the bailee according to the na-
ture and terms of the bailment, and a determination of
whether those duties and obligations were properly met
under common law rules of negligence. 125
A. Examples of Bailee Liability Situations
Although a bailee of an airplane is not generally consid-
ered an insurer of the craft against damage, he has the
duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances
and is liable for any damage resulting from the absence of
such care. 12 6 Bailees for repair have been found liable for
fire damage, aircraft destruction or damage caused by
wind or storm where the aircraft was not sufficiently tied
down, damage caused by negligent handling or parking,
and damage occurring during unauthorized use of the air-
craft by the bailee, his agents, or third parties. 27
In Winchell v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. ,128 the repairer agreed
to have a bailed aircraft overhauled within a period of
sixty days, but still retained possession of the unrepaired
aircraft more than one year after the sixty days had ex-
, Annotation, Liability of Bailee of Airplane for Damage Thereto, 44 A.L.R.3d 862,
867 (1972).
1.5 Id. at 866.
126 id. at 868. For the liability of a bailee or lessee of an aircraft, generally, see 8
AM. JUR. 2D Aviation §§ 28-29 (1972).
.27 See notes 126-145 and accompanying text for examples of liability of aircraft
bailees; see also F. BIEHLER, supra note 4, at 63-86 for a discussion of bailment
liability of aircraft servicers.
12" 96 F. Supp. 339 (D. Alaska 1951).
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pired. The court held that the long delay in making re-
pairs was negligence, and that such negligence, in
concurrence with a hangar fire, was the proximate cause
of the loss of the aircraft. Thus, the bailor was entitled to
recovery. 29 The court noted, however, that the nature of
the repair contract did not make the repairer an insurer of
* the aircraft. 30 Express language to that effect is necessary
to convert the bailee's liability to that of an insurer.' 3'
A common situation giving rise to an action against a
bailee for repair of an aircraft occurs when a parked plane
is destroyed or damaged by violent storms or gusts of
wind. 32 In Olan Mills, Inc. v. Cannon Aircraft Executive Ter-
minal, Inc. ,'3 a repairer was held liable for negligently fail-
ing to properly secure the bailor's aircraft against
expected dangerous weather conditions. The court deter-
mined that a storm with heavy winds gusting to ninety-two
miles per hour was not "so extraordinary or so far outside
the range of human experience" as to excuse the repairer
for destruction of the plane under the force majeure
doctrine. 34
Courts have also held bailees liable for negligently
parking or otherwise handling aircraft bailed for repair. 35
A typical example is M.B. Haynes Electric Corp. v. Justice Aero
Co., ' 36 in which an aircraft was damaged when an em-
ployer of the repairer apparently lost control of the air-
craft as he was attempting to park it, causing it to collide
129 Id. at 340; see also Southeastern Air Serv., Inc. v. Edwards, 74 Ga. App. 582,
40 S.E.2d 572 (1946) (aircraft servicer liable as bailee for fire caused by negligent
handling of radio equipment).
Winchell, 96 F. Supp. at 340.
1I1 Id.
112 See, e.g., Rutledge v. Des Moines Flying Serv., Inc., 254 Iowa 809, 119
N.W.2d 262 (1963) (bailee liable for damage to plane caused by windstorm where
plane was improperly tied down).
'- 273 N.C. 519, 160 S.E.2d 735 (1968).
11 Id. at 741.
I.- See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. General Air Serv., Inc., 513 So. 2d
1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (bailee liable for parts broken while aircraft was in
possession of air service company); see also Annotation, supra note 124.
1-- 263 N.C. 437, 139 S.E.2d 682 (1965).
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with another plane.'3 7 The court found that the bailor's
evidence showing that he delivered his airplane to the
bailee in fine performing condition for repairs to its radio,
that the bailee accepted it, and that the next day the bailee
had the airplane in its possession and control in damaged
condition made out a prima facie case of actionable negli-
gence against the bailee.13 8
Bailees of aircraft have also been charged with liability
for damage sustained by the aircraft while being used in
violation of a written or oral agreement between the
bailor and the repairer. 139 In Gruender v. Holt,' 40 for exam-
ple, the plaintiff's aircraft, which had been leased to a
third party, was confiscated by local drug enforcement
agencies. The craft had suffered substantial damages
from its use in illegal drug trafficking activities. The
plaintiff recovered his aircraft and delivered it to the re-
pairer for service with strict instructions not to release it
to anyone other than the plaintiff.'4 ' The plane was sub-
sequently stolen, and one of the plaintiff's arguments was
that the repairer was absolutely liable for the "misdeliv-
ery" of the plane to the thief.' 42 In the alternative, the
plaintiff claimed that the repairer was liable for the theft
because it was negligent in protecting the aircraft. 143 The
court held that even though the repairer's failure to de-
liver the plane established a prima facie case of negli-
gence, the repairer was not at fault in the bailment action
for contributing to theft because it had used reasonable
care to protect the plane. 144 The court noted that the
1-47 Id. at 683.
'', Id. at 685.
See, e.g., Southeastern Air Serv., Inc. v. Carter, 78 Ga. App. 8, 50 S.E.2d 156
(1948) (repairer liable for destruction of plane which occurred during unauthor-
ized test flight); Lewis v. Jensen, 39 Wash. 2d 301, 235 P.2d 312 (1951) (aircraft
repair company liable when plane was stolen and destroyed after repairer negli-
gently left keys in plane).
14o 714 F.2d 45 (6th Cir. 1983).
1 Id. at 46.
142 Id.
141 Id.
14 Id. at 47. The defendant secured the plane by tying it down, chocking the
wheels, locking the cabin, and removing the keys. Id. In addition, a chain link
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plaintiff could not claim that the repairer failed to secure
the plane properly, especially since the plaintiff failed to
inform the repairer of the substantial likelihood that the
plane would be stolen again. 45
B. Liability Limitations in Bailment Contracts
Contractual limitations of liability, which are not un-
common in bailment contracts, can be a prominent factor
in relieving a repairer of liability. In Revenue Aero Club v.
Alexandria Airport,' 46 an aircraft owner executed a repair
contract stating that the repairer would not be held re-
sponsible for loss occasioned by fire, theft, or any other
means beyond the control of the repairer. Although the
aircraft was subsequently stolen, the court held that the
repairer was not liable, and pointed out that the agree-
ment involved was not an ordinary contract of bailment
because of the liability limitations. 47 The owner was thus
under a burden to prove that the loss of the aircraft could
have been prevented by the repairer. 48 In summary,
courts today seem unwilling to hold aircraft servicers lia-
ble as virtual insurers of the planes they repair, and ap-
pear quite willing to enforce contract limitations in
aircraft bailment situations - views which seem generally
favorable to aircraft servicers.
V. GUIDELINES FOR AVOIDING LIABILITY
The current trend toward inflated verdicts, coupled
with the public attitude toward consumerism, dictates fu-
ture increases in claims against aircraft repairers by own-
ers and operators. 49 What steps can be taken by repair
fence secured the area surrounding the plane and police systematically patrolled
the area. Id.
14. Id.
146 192 Va. 231, 64 S.E.2d 671 (1951).
147 Id. at 673.
,48 Id. The court stated that " [in this situation the bailee may escape liability by
showing that his failure to redeliver was.., without his fault, but this is an affirma-
tive defense which he must prove." Id.
.... Fulton, supra note 2, at 23.
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facilities to limit the impact of such lawsuits? Suggested
tentative guidelines include:
(a) Make sure employees are aware of maintenance and
record-keeping regulations. This will help ensure that
proper entries are made on work orders and in log
books. 150
(b) Include liability limitations in all service contracts.
These clauses should be specific and conspicuous.15 '
(c) Keep detailed files and records of airworthiness di-
rectives, beyond what is required by law. Include informa-
tion on how and when compliance was achieved, as well as
who performed the work.
(d) Make sure all maintenance and repair work is
double-checked by a supervisor or mechanic other than
one performing the work.
(e) List ADs which were complied with or were not ap-
plicable, instead of simply stating that all airworthiness di-
rectives have been complied with to the date of
inspection. 152
(f) Place the aircraft owner or pilot on written notice of
work which should be performed, but which by reason of
expense or the desire not to incur downtime is not under-
taken by the pilot or owner.
15 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The discussions above summarize some of the most
common bases of aircraft repairer liability. While liability
will, of course, depend on the specific facts of each case,
several apparent trends have emerged over the past few
decades, and these trends pose some potentially major
'." See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text for examples of regulations of
which aircraft mechanics should be aware.
'-1 See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text for examples of liability limi-
tations which have been upheld by courts.
'-2 Fulton, supra note 2, at 24.
15-1 Id. Additionally, Fulton suggests that following a claim or suit, the service
facility should make an investigation of service or maintenance performed at other
facilities, scrutinize the flight log and obtain the FAA record of the pilot, and se-
cure an expert to investigate the possibility of pilot error, negligence of another
service operator, or design-induced damage.
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implications for both aircraft servicers and owners. For
example, the variance in outcomes of recent negligence
cases seems to indicate a divergence of views on just ex-
actly what "reasonable care" means in regard to aircraft
servicers.154 The issues range from whether aircraft ser-
vicers should be held to a special standard of care due to
the extremely technical aspects of their work, to how
much responsibility aircraft owners should be required to
assume for the maintenance and inspection of their air-
craft. 55 Differing views on these issues could conceivably
give rise to forum shopping, as some jurisdictions are
bound to eventually appear more favorable to plaintiffs.
In addition, aircraft servicers in areas which tend to favor
plaintiffs might find they are operating less profitably as
insurance rates rise and court awards continue to in-
crease. The result might be a steep decrease in the
number of servicers in those geographical areas, which
would certainly be a major disadvantage to the aircraft
and flight industries. One solution might be a clarifica-
tion of the standard of care required of aircraft servicers,
including a more specific rule on responsibility for com-
pliance with ADs.
Application of "strict liability" to repairs and services is
still an unsettled issue in many states, 56 adding further
uncertainty to the already risky aircraft service industry.
The current trend indicates a reluctance to apply strict lia-
bility in service cases - a position that seems in keeping
with the basic principles upon which strict liability was de-
veloped. Though some courts have indicated that repair-
ers can be strictly liable, most seem to agree that the
"defect" in such cases lies with the actual work and not
with the serviced aircraft. 57
Courts desiring to hold aircraft servicers absolutely lia-
ble can also adopt the emerging theory of implied war-
,.4 See supra notes 8-31 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
I.- See supra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
157 Id.
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ranty of workmanlike service."' Since no proof of
negligence is required under this theory, widespread
adoption would almost certainly result in an increased
number ofjudgments against servicers. Jurisdictions con-
sidering application of this theory should therefore also
consider the prudence of applying an absolute liability
theory to an industry as essential as the aircraft repair in-
dustry. Although negligence in the aircraft service field
cannot be tolerated, adoption of absolute liability may
cause an increase in insurance rates for repairers and a
potential decrease in the number of repairers who can af-
ford to remain in business.
Courts considering bailment cases today seem reluctant
to hold aircraft servicers to a standard of care so high as
to make them insurers,1 59 a view which seems contrary to
the direction many courts appear to be moving in the neg-
ligence and implied warranty areas. 60 While these preva-
lent views on bailment liability certainly seem fair to the
servicers, owners could be disadvantaged in not being
able to recover for theft or damage if the servicer can
show he used reasonable care. One possible implication
could be a tendency by aircraft owners to avoid servicers
whose contracts include broad liability disclaimers, as-
suming other servicers are available. Additionally, aircraft
owners will be forced to assume greater responsibility for
making their planes theft-proof and for selecting the most
careful servicers - a responsibility which does not seem
unreasonable.
Aircraft servicers should certainly realize the over-
whelmingly urgent need to take action now that might
avoid liability in the future. Accurate record-keeping, ad-
herence to sound business practices, and routine use of
liability limitations in service contracts are simple meas-
ures that will contribute greatly toward this end. Ser-
vicers should also pay close attention to the fate of strict
See supra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 124-148 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154, 158.
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liability and implied warranty theories in aircraft repair
cases. If these theories become widely adopted, the im-
pact is likely to be felt throughout the aircraft and flight
industries, and a potentially major increase in liability
awards to aircraft owners and passengers could make air-
craft servicers an endangered species.
